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Abstract 
 
We examine whether the relative equity market valuation conditions (EMVCs) in the 
merging firms countries help DFTXLUHUV¶managers to time the announcements of domestic 
and foreign target acquisitions. After controlling for several deal- and merging firms-
specific features we find that acquisition activity, as well as acquirers gains, are 
significantly higher during periods of high-EMVCs at home, irrespective of the domicile 
of the target. We also find that the higher foreign acquirers¶ gains that reaped during 
periods of high-EMVCs at home are realized by deals of targets based in the RoW 
(=World-G7), rather than G6 (=G7-UK) countries, which is due to the low correlation of 
EMVCs between the U.K. (home) and the RoW countries. Moreover, acquisition of 
targets domiciled in the RoW (G6) countries yield higher (lower) gains than domestic 
targets during periods of high-EMVCs at home. This suggests that the relative EMVCs 
EHWZHHQWKHPHUJLQJILUPV¶FRXQWULHVallow acquirers¶ managers to time the market and 
acquire targets at a discount, particularly in countries in which DFTXLUHUV¶ stocks are likely 
to be more overvalued than the targets¶VWRFNV. 
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when it comes to a deal´June 2015, Wilhelm Schulz, head of Europe, Middle East and 
Africa M&A at Citigroup. 
 
1. Introduction 
Record valuations in 2015 point to a new record of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
boom with the expectation of M&As continuing for at least another year due to favorable 
economic conditions (Fontanella-Khan, Massoudi and Rennison, 2015). Favorable 
market and economic conditions lead to firms financing a large proportion of their 
financing deficit with net external equity, particularly when the cost of equity is low 
(Huang and Ritter, 2009). An extant literature has emerged over the last few decades 
investigating the valuation effects of M&As on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. 
Some of the earlier studies focus on the valuation effects of factors pertinent to deal and 
merger partners1, while others analyze the implications of equity market valuation 
conditions (EMVCs).2  
However, there are still considerable gaps in our understanding of the determinants 
of merger value creation, and in particular of the impact of EMVCs on the wealth of 
shareholders of firms engaged in domestic vs. foreign target M&As. This becomes 
particularly interesting in the presence of the theoretical framework of Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) who argue that more overvalued acquirers tend to use their shares to 
acquire less overvalues targets. Therefore, whether this consensus appeals in domestic vs. 
foreign deals, especially when EMVCs of the merging firms are not correlated, remains 
                                                 
1
 These studies are mainly concerned with the sensitivity of DFTXLUHUV¶ gains to deal and firm-specific 
characteristics, such as the relative size of the deal (Asquith et al. 1983), the method of payment (Travlos, 
1987), the listing status of targets (Draper and Paudyal, 2006), the size of the acquirer (Moeller et al. 2004), 
and the growth opportunities of the acquirer (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
2
 See for example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes±Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). 
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to be investigated. We fill this void by empirically examining whether managers time the 
announcement of both domestic and foreign M&As, as captured by the EMVC at home 
relative to that in the host markets. The U.K. offers an excellent ground to investigate the 
above, since UK acquirers are the most active worldwide in engaging in CBA activities,3 
Existing evidence confirms that takeovers of domestic targets cluster over time4 and 
several theories attempt to explain this phenomenon, such as the neoclassical theory of 
mergers, the strategic theory and the behavioral approach, among others. The neoclassical 
theory of merger waves, which is mainly associated with the work of Gort (1969), posits 
that M&A activity spikes with technological, economic and/or regulatory industry 
shocks. Similarly, in an earlier work Nelson (1959) showed that M&A activity is highly 
associated with business cycles. The behavioral explanation of Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), argues that the observed clustering in M&A activity is largely driven by stock 
market miss-valuations. Rau and Stouraitis (2009) argue that the waves of corporate 
activity are driven by a time-varying influence of both the neoclassical and the miss-
valuation hypotheses. 
The strategic theory of merger waves focuses on the acquisition performance, 
motives, and strategies (Kusewitt, 1985; and Toxvaerd, 2008). Toxvaerd (2008) develops 
a theoretical model suggesting that competitive pressure interacts with the irreversibility 
of M&As in an uncertain environment, and argues that acquirers either postpone the bid 
in order to gain from more favorable future market conditions, or enter the bidding 
contest. He shows that in complete information model all acquirers rush to bid creating 
                                                 
3
 Healy and Palepu (1993) portray the U.K. as a leader in CBA deals accounting for roughly 30% of global 
activity in the late 1980s. Similarly data available from the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2000) portray the 
U.K. as holding the same proportion of CBA activity by the late 1990s. In 2007 the value of CBA worldwide 
reached $1,197bn compared to only $39bn in 1987 (UNCTAD, 2009) with the U.K. being the leading 
country on these figures. 
4
 See for example, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), and Bouwman et al. (2009). 
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merger waves. However, in an incomplete information environment, various factors 
representing economic fundamentals, including the benefits from mergers and target 
scarcity, affect the timing of the merger waves. 
High investor sentiment leads to greater mispricing (Stambaugh et al., 2012). The 
evidence on M&As in the U.S. suggests that the announcement period gains, as well as 
the long-term performance of acquirers, are also dependent on factors representing stock 
market conditions at the time of the M&A announcement. For example, Bouwman et al. 
(2009) show that during periods of high-EMVCs acquirers gain higher abnormal returns 
in the short-run, but such gains are eliminated in the long-run. Rosen (2006) also confirms 
the same pattern in the performance of acquirers and argues that the observed superior 
announcement period gains of acquirers at the time of high-EMVCs are driven by 
LQYHVWRUV¶ VHQWLPHQW However, whether the level of EMVCs, and more specifically, 
relative EMVCs between the merging firms countries in CBAs, influence the gains of 
domestic versus foreign acquirers remains to be investigated. 
Following the globalization of financial markets and the relaxation of restrictions in 
capital mobility, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBAs) have increased 
substantially. For example, the World Investment Report (UNCTAD) 2009 (p. 11) shows 
that in 2007 the total value of global CBA deals reached over 1.97bn U.S. dollars 
compared to only $39bn in 1987, which represents a record increase of more than 62% 
RYHUWKHYDOXHRI,QWKHVDPH\HDU%ULWLVKILUPV¶QHWSXUFKDVHVUHDFKHGRI
the global market. Consequently, the literature has turned to investigate the effects of 
domestic vs. CBAVRQDFTXLUHUV¶JDLQV5 Unlike domestic deals, CBAs present additional 
complexity and valuation risk for acquirers, such as political, economic and foreign 
                                                 
5
 See for example, Doukas and Travlos (1988), Gregory and McCorriston (2005), and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005). 
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exchange risk. Along these lines, di Giovanni (2005) shows that financial and other 
institutional factors play significant roles in explaining CBAs activities, with the size of 
financial markets being one of the most influential factors. Moreover, the gains of merger 
partners in CBAs are affected by the strength of the acquirers¶GRPHVWLFFXUUHQF\.DQJ
1993). Froot and Stein (1991SUHGLFWWKDWZKHQDFTXLUHUV¶FXUUHQF\LVVWURQJDJDLQVWWKH
U.S. dollar they will have an advantage when purchasing U.S. targets. This is empirically 
confirmed by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) who study U.S. target firms only and find 
that a stronger currency ± against the U.S. dollar ± of foreign acquirers leads to higher 
short-term wealth effects for U.S. targets at the time of the M&A announcement. 
The existing evidence, discussed above, suggests that M&As activities (both 
domestic and cross-border) are affected by financial and economic conditions in the 
DFTXLUHU¶VKRPHPDUNHW+RZHYHUOLWWOHLVNQRZQDbout the effect of relative EMVCs on 
the gains of acquirers targeting domestic vs. foreign firms. We aim to address this issue 
and identify whether DFTXLUHUV¶managers can extract any benefit by timing the market, 
namely whether the relative EMVCs LQPHUJLQJILUPV¶FRXQWULHVDOORZWKHPWR time the 
announcement of domestic and foreign target M&As. 
Our results show that acquirers enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns from deals 
made during high-EMVCs periods at home, regardless of the target being a domestic or 
a foreign firm. We further find that foreign target acquirers enjoy greater gains from deals 
made during high-EMVCs at home only when the EMVCs between the merging firms¶ 
countries are less likely to be correlated, which falls in the category of the target being in 
the RoW (=World-G7) rather than in the G6 (=G7-U.K.) countries. We argue that the 
EMVCs at home, relative to host countries, allow DFTXLUHUV¶managers to time the market 
and acquire targets at a discount, particularly in markets in which their stocks are likely 
to be more overvalued than their targets. British acquirers also reap superior gains from 
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deals announced during relatively strong trade-weighted effective exchange rate of the 
domestic currency. In the context of domestic deals vs. CBAs we find that foreign M&As 
of targets in the RoW (G6) countries yield higher (lower) DFTXLUHUV¶gains than domestic 
ones when made during periods of high-EMVCs at home. We argue that a possible reason 
for this finding is related to the fact that the EMVCs in the RoW (G6) are lower (similar) 
to the ones at home and hence, acquirers are more likely to be able (unable) to acquire 
targets at a discount. Overall, our results suggest that DFTXLUHUV¶ managers aiming to 
maximize theLU VKDUHKROGHUV¶ wealth could extract signals from EMVCs of the home, 
relative to those in host countries, and therefore carefully pick the timing of their M&As 
announcements. 
We contribute to the related literature by demonstrating the role of EMVCs at home, 
relative to EMVCs in the host countries in the case of CBAs, on the gains directed to 
DFTXLUHUV¶shareholders in the short-run. Our findings suggest that firms willing to engage 
in acquisitions should consider not only the merging firms and deal specific factors, but 
also the possible implications of external factors such as EMVCs at home, relative to 
EMVCs in the host country. Therefore, a simultaneous analysis of EMVCs in the merging 
ILUPV¶FRXQWULHVcan help managers in timing the announcement of both domestic and 
foreign target M&As and maximize VKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWK. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology employed. The empirical results are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 EMVCs and gains from M&A 
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A growing body of literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) suggests that during high-
EMVCs periods, managers of firms with overvalued stocks are motivated to use their 
overvalued stocks to bid for targets that they perceive to be less overvalued than 
themselves. In the long-run, however, when the market corrects for overvaluation, the 
acquirers suffer a drop in share price indicating long-term under-performance. This 
theoretical proposition has been supported by the empirical findings of, among others, 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005). Although the theoretical proposition 
of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) is limited to all-share deals, a similar effect of high-EMVCs 
can occur on the performance of acquirers in other types of deals, such as cash and mixed, 
due to managerial overconfidence and invHVWRUV¶RSWLPLVPFDXVHGE\KLJK-EMVCs. The 
managers of a company whose market value is increasing are likely to be overconfident 
about their managerial ability and start bidding for targets, possibly to build their own 
empire (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). When share prices are increasing, investors are also 
likely to have increased confidence in their managers and react positively to acquisition 
decisions. Consequently, acquirers are likely to experience higher announcement period 
abnormal returns from the bids announced at the time of high-EMVCs irrespective of the 
payment method. In contrast, at the time of low-EMVCs, investors are likely to be 
skeptical about the value of deals and react cautiously. This leads to the first testable 
hypothesis (H1): µ0	$DQQRXQFHPHQWVGXULQJKLJK-EMVC-periods yield higher short-
run abnormal returns than deals announced during low-EMVC-SHULRGV¶. 
Rosen (2006) suggests that the short-run performance of bidding firms is a function 
RILQYHVWRUV¶RSWLPLVPUHJDUGLQJWKHDFTXLVLWLRQ¶VIXWXUHSURVSHFW7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI
inveVWRUV¶VHQWLPHQWQDPHO\FRQILGHQFHRQM&A announcements are likely to differ by 
the domicile of the target, given that foreign investments generally add to the level of 
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uncertainty regarding the expected value to be generated from the transaction, mainly due 
to its additional exchange rate, economic and political risks. 
During periods of low-EMVCs, this added uncertainty exacerbates the already low 
LQYHVWRU¶VVHQWLPHQWV7KXVforeign acquisitions during low-EMVC periods are expected 
to yield less than domestic deals. During high-EMVC periods, however, acquirers of 
foreign targets are expected to yield a more favorable market reaction than domestic 
deals GULYHQ E\ WKH KLJKHU LQYHVWRUV¶ RSWLPLVP 7KHVH DUJXPHQWV OHDG WR WKH VHFRQG
testable hypothesis (H2): µ&%$s announced during high-EMVC periods at home 
outperform domestic deals announced during similar periods¶. 
 
2.2 Relative Equity Market Valuation Conditions and the gains from CBA 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argues that during high-EMVC periods the managers of firms 
with overvalued stocks are motivated to use their overvalued stocks to bid for targets that 
they perceive to be less overvalued than themselves. This is particularly interesting in the 
CBA context as different markets do curry different levels of EMVCs. Therefore, at a 
given level of EMVCs at home, whether foreign target acquirers time the market and bid 
for targets abroad is limited to their ability to identify less overvalued (foreign) targets 
than themselves. In this paper we argue that in CBAs the relative EMVCs (i.e. the extent 
to which EMVCs in the DFTXLUHU¶VFRXQWU\GLIIHUUHODWLYHWRWKHWDUJHW¶VFRXQWU\) provides 
an additional LQVLJKWWRWKHDFTXLULQJILUPV¶PDQDJHUVDLPLQJWRPD[LPL]HWKHZHDOWKRI
their shareholders. 
Specifically, at a high level of EMVCs at home, the lower the correlation of 
EMVCs EHWZHHQWKHDFTXLULQJDQGWDUJHWILUPV¶FRXQWULHVimply that WKHIRUHLJQPDUNHW¶V
EMVCs will be low, or lower than that at home KHQFH DFTXLUHUV¶ PDQDJHUV ZLWK
overvalued stock may take advantage to bid for less overvalue targets in such countries. 
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Therefore, acquirers of foreign targets based in low-EMVCs countries are expected to 
yield a more favorable market reaction. As discussed earlier, while this effect is more 
pronounce to share deals, it can also apply to other types of deals, such as cash and mixed, 
GXHWRPDQDJHULDORYHUFRQILGHQFHDQGLQYHVWRUV¶RSWLPLVPFDXVHGE\WKHOHYHORI(09&V 
at home. This leads to the third testable hypothesis (H3): µ$FTXLUHUVJDLQVLJQLILFDQWO\
more from CBAs announced during periods of high-EMVCs at home and low- or lower-
EMVCs in the host country¶. 
 
2.3 Strength of domestic currency and gains from M&A 
A number of studies on FDI (for example, di Giovanni, 2005) show that the strength of 
the domestic currency plays a significant role in determining the flow of foreign direct 
investment. On a theoretical framework Froot and Stein (1991) argue that when the U.S. 
dollar is weaker compared to foreign DFTXLUHUV¶ORFDOFXUUHQF\WKH\ZLOOKDYHDSXUFKDVLQJ
advantage for U.S. targets. In line with this theoretical prediction, Harris and Ravenscraft 
(1991) find that a weaker U.S. dollar leads to a higher market reaction for U.S. firms 
being targeted by acquirers with a stronger currency due to their purchasing advantage. 
When the domestic currency is stronger than its equilibrium value, it is cheaper for 
acquirers to acquire foreign targets. This phenomenon should not only enhance M&A 
activity but also generate higher gains to acquirers. This is because when the domestic 
currency is strong, the effective price (inclusive of premium) paid to foreign targets is 
more likely to be less than the equilibrium value of the target. Consequently, such deals 
are more liNHO\WRWUDQVIHUZHDOWKIURPWDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHKROGHUVWRWKHVKDUHKROGHUV
of the acquiring company. This leads to the fourth hypothesis (H4): µM&As announced 
at times of stronger domestic currency generate higher gains to acquirers¶ 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The information on the deal announcements is extracted from Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). The sample comprises of bids announced by U.K. firms between 01/01/1986 and 
31/12/2010. SDC records 67,229 M&As announced by U.K. firms during the sample 
period. However, the sample of acquisitions analyzed by the paper includes 6,260 (4,424 
domestic and 1,826 foreign) deals that meet the following criteria: (i) The acquirer is a 
U.K. company traded in the London Stock Exchange; (ii) the target is a private, a public, 
or a subsidiary firm, both domestic and foreign; (iii) to avoid the effects of very small 
transactions, only deals equal to, or greater than, £1 million are included; (iv) the market 
value of the acquirer is greater than £1 million at four weeks prior to the announcement 
of the deal; (v) acquiring firms are not involved in multiple bids during the 5-day 
announcement window of -2 to +2 days around the announcement day; (vi) the daily 
return to index, market value, and market-to-book-value ratio of the acquirer are obtained 
from DataStream. Finally, we collect the monthly P/E ratio for the FTSE All Share market 
index and the monthly P/E ratio for the 9 industry groups from DataStream in order to 
measure the EMVC. 
 
3.2 Sample features 
Table 1 reports the annual distribution of M&A deals announced by U.K. acquirers 
between 01/01/1986 and 31/12/2010. The table shows that almost one in three M&A deals 
(29.2%) involve foreign targets. The proportion of CBAs in the U.K. increased steadily 
over time, exceeding 40% of all deals in 2010. In addition, the proportion of CBA in G6 
(=G7-U.K.) countries (19.7%) is well over the proportion of CBA in the Rest of the World 
(RoW=World-G7) group of countries (9.5%). This sub-classification is inspired by the 
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evidence that the economic activity and stock market performance of the G7 countries 
(UK, US, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan) are more integrated than the rest-
of-the-world (Jansen and Stokman, 2004). The statistics also show that in approximately 
51% of the deals the merging firms are based in the same-industry (based on the same 2-
SIC code) while the remaining 49% are diversified deals. Overall, about one in two deals 
are settled in cash, while share only deals constitute less than 10% of the total number of 
deals in the sample. The proportion of cash only deals is much larger in CBA, while only 
about one in twenty CBA deals are settled in shares. 
(Insert table 1 about here) 
Table 2 (Panel A) shows that unlisted targets account for about 90% of all deals, 
while only one in ten deals involve listed targets. The dominance of unlisted targets in 
U.K. takeover deals is consistent with Draper and Paudyal (2006). The remaining 
statistics of either transaction- or firm-specific characteristics reported in Panel A show 
that the number of deals occurring during periods of high- vs. low-EMVCs, is 
significantly higher (1,825 vs. 1,565). Noticeably, the sum of deal value in each group is 
substantially higher for deals occurring during periods of booming than depressed 
markets across all classifications. 
(Insert table 2 about here) 
 The sum deal value of CBA deals is much larger (£345bn) compared to domestic 
deals (£185bn), while CBA deals are larger in the RoW countries compared to the G6 
countries. Table 2 (Panel B) also shows that the acquirers of foreign targets are more 
mature (19 years) than their counterparts of domestic targets (14 years). Furthermore, the 
average market capitalization of acquirers acquiring domestic targets (£432m) is less than 
the average market capitalization of acquirers of foreign targets (£1,600m). Acquirers of 
targets in the RoW countries (£1,628m) are larger than acquirers in the G6 countries 
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(£1,586m) albeit the deals being larger for the latter (£235m) than the former (£92m) 
group. Furthermore, the average acquirer of a domestic target is less liquid than the 
corresponding acquirers of a foreign target (0.13 vs, 0.15), has higher leverage (22.5 vs. 
19.9), and pays lower premia (36% vs. 45%). 
 
3.3 Classification of high-, neutral-, and low-EMVCs 
The EMVC is measured by market P/E ratio, using the FT All share index as market 
proxy and since the measure of EMVCs possesses an up-ward trend, it is de-trended using 
the method outlined in Bouwman et al. (2009). First, the best straight line fit value of the 
variable is removed from the observed value in each month and in five years preceding 
the announcement. Second, each month is categorized as above (below) the average if the 
deǦ trended value of the variable for the month is above (below) the average of the 
previous five years. Finally, the upper half of the above-average months (i.e., the 25% top 
months) are classified as high value periods and the lower half of the below-average 
months (i.e., the 25% bottom months) are classified as low value periods. All other 
months in the sample (i.e., 50% of the middle months) are classified as neutral. As implied 
by the stock market valuation argument of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), merger activity 
increases during high-EMVC periods (Table 2, Panel A). Moreover, this pattern holds for 
both domestic and CBAs. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
The performance of acquirers is analyzed by indicators of EMVCs using both univariate 
and multivariate frameworks. For the univariate analysis, first the excess returns of 
acquirers announcing bids under various financial conditions are tested, followed by the 
comparison of the gains of such acquirers. Finally, the gains of acquirers by the domicile 
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of their targets (domestic targets, foreign targets, acquirers of targets in G6 countries, and 
in the RoW) and EMVCs at the time of the bid announcement are also compared. Under 
multivariate analysis, similar tests on the gains of acquirers are performed after 
controlling for the effects of other factors using cross-sectional regressions that are known 
to affect the gains to acquirers. 
Because of multiple bids by the same acquirers occurring within a short period, 
sufficiently long time series of stock returns that are free from the effects of takeover bids 
are not available to apply conventional time-series based excess-return estimation 
models. For the same reason, recent studies in M&A (Draper and Paudyal, 2008 and the 
references cited therein) have used a market adjusted model. As a result, for measuring 
the announcement period abnormal returns of acquirers the market-adjusted model is 
employed as shown in equation 1: 
 ܣܴ௜ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ܴ௠௧ (1) 
where, Rit is the return of firm i on day t, and Rmt is the market return measured by the 
changes in FT-All Share Index (inclusive of dividends). The abnormal returns (ARi) are 
cumulated for the 5-days (-2,+2) surrounding the M&A bid announcements, as shown in 
equation 2: 
 ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ෍ ܣܴ௜௧௧ାଶ௧ିଶ  (2) 
 
3.5 Multivariate analysis 
To further investigate the implications of relative EMVCs on announcement period gains 
of the U.K. acquirers, we examine the impact of relative EMVCs after controlling for 
other factors that are known to affect acquirers¶ JDLQV VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ :H GR VR E\
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employing equation (3) estimated in a nested regression form with various combinations 
of explanatory variables discussed below. 
 ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ෍ ߚ௝ܺ௜௝ ൅ ߝ௜௞௝ୀଵ ݅ ൌ  ? ǥ  ܰ (3) 
In equation (3), the intercept, Į reflects the excess returns of acquirers after controlling 
for the effects of all explanatory variables, incorporated in the vector Xi, simultaneously, 
the impact of which is recorded in the vector ߚ௝. When the model is applied to analyzing 
the announcement period gains, the dependent variable (CARi) is measured by the 5-days 
cumulative excess return of acquirers as explained in equation (1). The vector of 
explanatory variables, Xi, includes a set of explanatory variables discussed below.  
Earlier literature, based on the experience of listed targets, shows that cash-only 
acquirers experience the highest gains, while share-only acquirers suffer a loss. However, 
Travlos (1987) shows that the method of payment interacts with the listing status of 
targets in shaping the gains of acquirers. Therefore, to control for the methods of payment, 
deals are classified into cash only, shares only, and mixed. Moreover, on the 
announcement of M&A deals acquirers of unlisted targets gain more than acquirers of 
listed targets (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Therefore, we control for the listing status of 
targets, namely listed, private and subsidiary. 
Larger acquirers gain less than smaller acquirers on the announcements of bids 
(Moeller et al., 2004). Therefore, to allow for this effect we control for the size of the 
acquirer, measured by their market capitalization (MV) four weeks before the 
announcement of the deal. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), among others, show that 
value acquirers (firms with low market-to-book value ratio) outperform glamour 
acquirers (firms with high market-to-book value ratio) in the short-run. Thus, we control 
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for the growth opportunity of bidding firms, measured by the market-to-book value 
(MTBV) ratio one month prior to the announcement of the deal. 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that DFTXLUHUV¶announcement period gains are 
dependent on the level of public information. Barry and Brown (1985) show that more 
information is available in the public domain in relation to firms with a long trading 
history. Since mature firms are likely to have a longer trading history, consequently more 
publicly available information, we control for DFTXLUHU¶Vmaturity (age) measured by the 
number of days from the date a firm is first recorded on DataStream6 and the date of the 
announcement. Several studies (Asquith et al., 1993) have shown that the DFTXLUHUV¶
announcement period returns increase with the size of the target relative to the value of 
the acquirer. This may be due to the stronger impact on the structure of the organization 
of the acquiring firm that relatively larger targets may have. It is also possible that the 
observed positive relation between the relative size of the deal and gains from acquisitions 
is simply a statistical effect as a relatively larger deal is likely to generate higher synergy 
gain, which could be substantial relative to the size of acquirer. The relative size of the 
deal is measured by the ratio of the DFTXLUHU¶Vmarket capitalization to the value of the 
deal. 
We also control for the Effective Exchange Rate (Effect. Ex. Rate) of Pound Sterling 
REWDLQHGIURPWKH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶VVWDWLVWLFDOGDWDEDVH in order to account for the impact 
RIWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHGRPHVWLFFXUUHQF\RQDFTXLUHUV¶JDLQV.7 In addition, we add a set of 
dummy variables that is assigned the value of 1 (0 otherwise) to control for: CBA deals, 
diversifying deals (defined as a deal when target and acquirer do not share the same 2-
                                                 
6
 This date corresponds to the first trading day of a listed firm. Since the disclosure requirements of listed 
firms are much more stringent and systematic, the listing period is a good proxy measure of the level of 
information in the public domain. 
7
 See www.bankofengland.co.uk. Moreover, the first difference of the effective exchange rate index (i.e. 
changes is the value) of Pound Sterling does not have any trend and hence its de-trending is not required. 
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digit SIC code), private targets, cash-only deals, stock-only deals, high EMVC period, 
period of strong domestic currency, and frequent acquirers. Finally, variables 
representing interactions between various measures of EMVCs are also introduced in the 
model. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
$FTXLUHUV¶Dnnouncement period gains 
This section presents and discusses the findings from the univariate and multivariate 
analysis of announcement period gains of acquirers against financial conditions (i.e. 
EMVCs) at the time of M&As announcements. The gains are also analyzed by the targets¶ 
domicile. The results reported in Table 3 (Panel A) show that the average acquirer earns 
statistically significant gains (1.47%) on the announcement of a takeover bid. This is 
consistent with recent U.K. studies that include M&As of both listed and unlisted targets 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006). The table further shows that firms acquiring domestic targets 
earn higher abnormal returns (1.56%) than firms acquiring foreign targets (1.27%). 
Further analysis (Panel B) conveys that domestic target acquirers: (i) outperform 
acquirers of foreign targets in the G6 by 0.69%; and (ii) yield similar abnormal returns to 
firms buying targets in the RoW countries. Moreover, among the CBAs, acquirers enjoy 
1.21% higher abnormal returns when targets are based in the RoW rather than in the G6 
countries (Panel B). Whether these gains to acquirers in the framework of domestic deals 
vs. CBAs are driven by the impact of EMVCs at home, relative to those in the host 
countries, remains to be empirically investigated. 
(Insert table 3 about here) 
 
4.2. EMVCs and acquirers¶JDLQV 
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Analysis of the acquirers¶JDLQVE\the EMVCs at the time of the M&A announcement 
reveal that the gains increase monotonically with EMVCs (Table 3, Panel A). The average 
gains to all acquirers increase from 1.15% for M&As announced during low-EMVC 
periods to 2.09% during high-EMVC periods. These findings are consistent with 
Bouwman et al. (2009) who conclude that acquirers enjoy higher short-term gains from 
announcing bids in high- rather low-EMVC periods. This pattern holds for the analysis 
based on the de-trended industry P/E ratio, confirming that the results are robust to the 
methods of assessment of market conditions. This evidence is not sensitive to the choice 
of the method of payment and confirms the prediction that acquirers should gain more 
from bids announced at the time of high-EMVCs GXHWRIDYRUDEOHLQYHVWRUV¶VHQWLPHQW
(optimism). Overall, the results support part of the first hypothesis (H1) and provide 
additional evidence in support of the neoclassical theory of mergers. 
Further analysis shows that EMVCs play a significant role in explaining the 
difference in DFTXLUHUV¶JDLQVE\WKHLUWDUJHWV¶GRPLFLOH (differentials recorded in Panel 
B). In particular, U.K. acquirers experience similar abnormal from domestic vs. foreign 
(as a whole) deals regardless the level of EMVC in the U.K. at the time of M&As 
announcements. However, we find that the groupings of the countries of foreign targets 
according to the degree of correlation of the EMVCs between home and host markets 
plays a significant role. Specifically, DFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV earn 1.12% higher abnormal 
returns when they acquire targets in the domestic rather than G6 group of countries. As 
the EMVCs between the home and host -G6- countries are highly correlated (see 
Appendix B), the impact of EMVCs between the merging firms markets remains trivial. 
On the contrary, M&As of foreign targets in the RoW countries (a) earn similar abnormal 
returns to domestic target acquirers, and (b) enjoy significantly higher abnormal returns 
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to acquirers in the G6 countries.8 We argue that the EMVCs at home relative to those in 
KRVW FRXQWULHV DOORZ DFTXLUHUV¶ PDQDJHUV WR WLPH WKH PDUNHW Dnd acquire targets at a 
discount, particularly in markets in which their stocks are likely to be more overvalued 
than their targets. Therefore, a possible reason for these findings is that the EMVCs in the 
RoW (G6) are lower (similar) to the home ones and hence British acquirers are able 
(unable) to acquire targets at a discount. Accordingly, this suggests that the null difference 
between domestic and foreign targets is balanced out by CBAs in the RoW countries, as 
CBAs in the G6 group are experiencing losses. These findings support the second and 
third hypotheses (H2 and H3) relating to the level of EMVCs at home, relative to those 
in host countries, and the gains from domestic vs. CBAs. Overall, the findings reported 
in Table 3 (Panel A) show that EMVCs interact with the domicile of targets in shaping 
the gains to acquirers. 
In summary, the results of the univariate analysis reported in Table 3 confirm that 
DFTXLUHUV¶gains are dependent on the EMVCs at the time of bid announcements, as well 
as the domicile of the target firm. This suggests that in making a takeover decision the 
managers of bidding companies should consider the EMVCs in the home market. 
 
4.3. Announcement period gains of acquirers ± A cross-sectional analysis 
We further explore in a multivariate framework the impact of EMVCs at home, relative 
to EMVCs in host countries, along with several other known determinants that influence 
merger success, on the short-run acquirerV¶ gains. The results are reported in Table 4. 
(Insert table 4 about here) 
                                                 
8
 This pattern holds when the 9 industry P/E ratios are employed to assess the market valuation conditions. 
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 As indicated by the intercept µĮ¶ of models 5 and 7 (models 1 to 4, and 6), an average 
acquirer earns significant gains (breakeven) from M&As after controlling for the impact 
of several merging firms- and deal-specific factors, as well as the impact of EMVCs. 
Moreover, models 1 to 3 show that acquirers enjoy significant gains from deals 
announced during high-EMVC, despite the domicile of the target firm. This finding 
supports our first hypothesis (H1). Model 3 further shows that M&As made during 
periods of high-EMVCs at home and financed with stock are associated with the highest 
gDLQVWRDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV This provides great further support to our first hypothesis 
(H1), the empirical findings of Bouwman et al. (2009) and the theoretical findings of 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Among the variables of interest, the strength of the domestic 
currency exerts a positive effect RQDFTXLUHUV¶JDLQVZKLFKsupports our fourth hypothesis 
(H4). The favorable effect of the strength of the domestic currency is not limited to 
acquirers engaged in foreign targets, but it is also important for acquirers of domestic 
targets. Higher gains from domestic target M&As are possible because the strength of 
domestic currency reflects expected growth in the economy and investors are willing to 
pay a higher price for stocks of growing/expanding firms. Hence, the markets react 
favorably to announcements of (also) domestic M&As. 
 Model 2 shows that U.K. acquirers of foreign targets in the RoW countries enjoy 
significant gains in the short-run, which partly supports our second hypothesis (H2). 
Moreover, models 4 and 6 show that U.K. foreign acquirers of targets in the RoW rather 
than G6 countries enjoy significant gains in the announcement period, which is more 
pronounced if M&As are announced during high-EMVCs periods at home. This provides 
great support to our third hypothesis (H3), which predicts that M&As with targets in 
countries with EMVCs being lower than those at home should yield higher gains to 
DFTXLUHUV¶ VKDUHKROGHUV On the contrary, foreign target acquirers in G6 countries 
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experience significant losses in the announcement period. We argue that this is the 
outcome of the high correlation of EMVCs between the U.K. and G6 countries (see 
Appendix B), which ultimately diminishes the impact of EMVCs in such deals and further 
confirm the findings reported by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Barbopoulos, 
Paudyal and Pescetto (2012).9 
 The findings also show the importance of firm and deal- and merging firms-specific 
features in determining the gains to DFTXLUHUV¶shareholders in the domestic vs. foreign 
target acquisitions. Specifically, the relative size of the deal (across all models), stock 
payments (models 1, 2, 5 and 7), target listing status (i.e. unlisted, across all models), 
liquidly of the acquiring firm (models 1 to 3) have a significant and positive effect on 
DFTXLUHUV¶JDLQV7KHSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIWKHUHODWLYHGHDO¶VVL]HLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKSUHYLRXV
studies, which conclude that the acquiring ILUP¶V DEQRUPDO UHWXUQs increase with the 
WDUJHW¶VVL]HUHODWLYHWRWKHDFTXLUHU¶VVL]H$VTXLWKHWDO7KHFDVHRIWKHHYLGHQFH
of positive gains from stock deals is similar to the findings of Draper and Paudyal (2006). 
In particular, provided that the U.K. market is overpopulated by unlisted target deals 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006), stock financing of such deals OHDGV WR KLJKHU DFTXLUHUV¶
abnormal returns in the short-run (Chang, 1998). Finally, the estimates suggest that 
foreign acquirers with higher market-to-book-value gain more from acquisitions (models 
4 to 7). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine whether the short-run abnormal returns of the shareholders of U.K. firms 
that engaged in domestic and foreign acquisitions is affected by the home EMVCs at the 
                                                 
9
 Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) show that U.S. acquires enjoy higher gains from domestic deals rather 
than foreign target ones. BDUERSRXORVHWDOVKRZWKDW8.ELGGHUV¶JDLQVIURPGRPHVWLFYVIRUHLJQ
target deals are not significantly different. 
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time of M&As announcements, as well as the relative EMVCs between the merging 
firms¶ countries in CBAs. We find that acquirers enjoy significantly higher announcement 
period gains from deals made during high- rather than low-EMVC at home, regardless of 
the domicile of the target firm. We further show that foreign target acquirers enjoy greater 
gains from deals made during high-EMVCs at home only when the EMVCs between the 
PHUJLQJILUPV¶FRXQWULHVDUHOHVVOLNHO\WREHFRUrelated, which falls in the category of the 
target being in the RoW rather than in the G6 countries. Our findings also show that 
during high-EMVCs at home, domestic deals yield higher gains than foreign ones in the 
G6 countries. Provided that EMVCs in G6 countries are highly correlated to the ones at 
home (see Appendix B), U.K. acquirers are less able to extract any gains from CBAs due 
to the high-EMVCs in the host countries. Hence, in the absence of the impact of EMVCs, 
the gains of domestic deals vs. CBAs confirm those reported by Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) and Barbopoulos et al. (2012). 
However, we find that acquirers of domestic targets, and also foreign targets in the 
RoW countries, realize similar announcement period gains regardless of the level of 
EMVCs at home. Moreover, within CBAs, deals of targets in the RoW countries 
outperform those in the G6 countries when announced during periods of high-EMVCs at 
home. Provided that the correlation of EMVCs between the U.K. and the RoW (G6) 
countries is low (high), U.K. acquirers are able (unable) to extract significant gains from 
foreign deals in the RoW (G6) countries that made during high-EMVCs at home. This is 
possible due to the low EMVCs in the RoW countries (as the correlation of EMVCs 
between the U.K. and RoW is low) and hence, DFTXLUHUV¶PDQDJHUVare able to time the 
market and acquire targets in the RoW countries at a discount, particularly in markets in 
which their stocks are likely to be more overvalued than their targets. 
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Overall, RXU UHVXOWV VXJJHVW WKDW DFTXLUHUV¶ PDQDJHUV DLPLQJ WR PD[LPL]H WKHLU
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK FDQ H[WUDFW VLJQDOV IURP (09&V RI WKH KRPH UHODWLYH WR KRVW
countries, and carefully pick the timing of their M&As announcements in both the 
domestic and foreign market. 
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Table 1. $QQXDO0	$$FWLYLW\E\7DUJHW)LUP¶V'RPLFLOH,QGXVWU\DQG0HWKRGRI3D\PHQW 
The table presents the annual distribution of M&As announced by U.K. acquirers between 01/01/1986 and 31/12/2010. The 
GLVWULEXWLRQRI0	$VLVSUHVHQWHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHWDUJHWILUP¶VGRPLFLOHGRPHVWLFIRUHLJQDQGIRUHLJQGHDOV¶VXEJURXSVLQFOXGLQJ
the G6 (=G7±U.K.) and the RoW (=World±G7)), PHUJLQJILUPV¶LQGXVWU\FODVVLILFDWLRQIRFXVHGDQGGLYHUVLI\LQJDQGWKHYDULRXV
payment methods that used in the financing process of deals (Cash, Stock, and Mixed). Appendix A refers to the definition of each 
variable. 
Year ALL DOM CBA G6 RoW FOC DIV CASH STOCK MIXED 
1986 38 24 14 14 0 19 19 20 11 7 
1987 118 95 23 18 5 51 67 48 29 41 
1988 264 206 58 42 16 98 166 115 23 126 
1989 336 247 89 67 22 138 198 163 30 143 
1990 204 149 55 39 16 86 118 105 14 85 
1991 137 113 24 16 8 55 82 54 15 68 
1992 138 107 31 21 10 49 89 59 11 68 
1993 210 162 48 33 15 85 125 90 17 103 
1994 262 201 61 41 20 127 135 118 24 120 
1995 278 200 78 61 17 107 171 106 18 154 
1996 315 233 82 58 24 142 173 138 22 155 
1997 383 262 121 81 40 165 218 152 23 208 
1998 411 282 129 86 43 222 189 212 20 179 
1999 434 298 136 97 39 253 181 197 26 211 
2000 435 295 140 91 49 244 191 160 44 231 
2001 302 208 94 69 25 166 136 104 19 179 
2002 217 163 54 32 22 115 102 110 14 93 
2003 193 127 66 50 16 123 70 92 10 91 
2004 214 151 63 45 18 124 90 81 11 122 
2005 292 210 82 52 30 173 119 128 16 148 
2006 298 202 96 54 42 180 118 127 9 162 
2007 336 226 110 59 51 201 135 129 13 194 
2008 183 111 72 47 25 107 76 86 8 89 
2009 96 63 33 19 14 56 40 44 12 40 
2010 166 99 67 39 28 89 77 93 9 64 
Total 6,260 4,434 1,826 1,231 595 3,175 3,085 2,731 448 3,081 
% - 70.83 29.17 19.66 9.50 50.72 49.28 43.63 7.16 49.21 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
,Q3DQHO$WKHVDPSOHLVFODVVLILHGE\WDUJHWILUP¶VGRPLFLOHGRPHVWLF&%A, and CBA sub-groups including the G6 (=G7-U.K.) and the RoW (=World-G7)), SIC 2-
GLJLWLQGXVWU\FODVVLILFDWLRQIRFXVHGDQGGLYHUVLI\LQJPHWKRGRISD\PHQWFDVKDQGVWRFNDQGWDUJHWILUP¶VOLVWLQJVWDWXs (unlisted and listed). The sample comprises 
M&As announced by U.K. acquirers between 01/01/1986 and 31/12/2010 and recorded by the SDC. Acquirers are firms listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
In Panel A, N represents the number of deals; % is number of deals in a group as a proportion of All deals in each column rounded off to the nearest integer; Sum of DV 
in billions pounds is the sum of deal values of all deals in each group; the sum of DV is rounded off to the nearest billion pounds. In Panel B the mean and median are 
the group mean and median. The process of de-trending is discussed in Section 3.3. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A 
  ALL DOM CBA Focused (FOC) 
Diversifying 
(DIV) CASH STOCK 
Target Listing Status 
  ALL G6 RoW Unlisted Public 
ALL 
N 6,260 4,434 1,826 1,231 595 3,175 3,085 2,731 448 5,641 619 
%  - 70.8 29.2 19.7 9.5 50.7 49.3 43.6 7.2 90.1 9.9 
Sum of DV (in £ bn) 530 185 345 290 55 374 156 135 57 186 343 
Low-EMVCs 
N 1,565 1,152 413 289 124 749 816 692 119 1,423 142 
% 25.0 18.4 6.6 4.6 2.0 12.0 13.0 11.1 1.9 22.7 2.3 
Sum of DV (in £ bn) 75 41 34 27 7 34 41 30 8 43 32 
Neutral-EMVCs 
N 2,870 2,010 860 566 294 1,498 1,372 1,246 190 2,601 269 
%  45.9 32.1 13.7 9.0 4.7 23.9 21.9 19.9 3.0 41.6 4.3 
Sum of DV (in £ bn) 159 85 75 46 28 105 55 66 27 84 74 
High-EMVCs 
N 1,825 1,272 553 376 177 928 897 793 139 1,617 208 
% 29.2 20.3 8.8 6.0 2.8 14.8 14.3 12.7 2.2 25.8 3.3 
Sum of DV (in £ bn) 296 59 236 217 20 235 60 39 22 59 237 
Panel B 
 
MV (in £ bn) DV (in £ m) Deal Relative Size MTBV Age (in years) Liquidity Leverage Premium 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ALL 772.49 119.10 84.61 7.15 0.33 0.07 2.85 2.07 15.93 12.91 0.13 0.08 21.73 17.03 38.84 35.73 
Low-EMVCs 618.84 112.56 48.11 6.50 0.28 0.07 3.78 2.04 16.11 13.85 0.13 0.08 18.78 16.67 38.14 36.36 
Neutral-EMVCs 793.13 116.80 55.54 7.06 0.32 0.07 2.68 2.06 16.00 12.52 0.14 0.08 19.21 16.68 37.67 33.64 
High-EMVCs 871.79 128.01 161.64 7.97 0.41 0.07 2.34 2.16 15.67 12.45 0.14 0.09 28.23 17.95 40.60 37.49 
DOMESTIC 431.65 78.86 41.65 6.00 0.35 0.09 2.65 1.90 14.59 10.92 0.13 0.07 22.54 15.89 36.15 34.29 
CBA (ALL) 1,600.13 345.41 188.93 11.96 0.30 0.05 3.32 2.43 19.19 20.21 0.15 0.11 19.87 18.76 45.07 36.96 
CBA (G6) 1,586.49 356.68 235.58 14.22 0.25 0.05 2.90 2.47 19.72 21.39 0.15 0.11 20.19 19.50 45.12 39.13 
CBA (RoW) 1,628.35 289.92 92.42 8.09 0.38 0.04 4.20 2.38 18.10 16.70 0.17 0.11 19.20 17.47 44.85 24.48 
Focused 767.95 112.81 117.82 7.60 0.28 0.08 2.89 2.06 13.97 9.91 0.14 0.08 24.50 16.97 39.83 35.52 
Diversifying 777.16 124.08 50.44 6.80 0.39 0.06 2.81 2.09 17.96 19.09 0.13 0.08 18.84 17.04 37.83 36.09 
Unlisted 663.61 111.79 33.04 6.14 0.31 0.06 2.95 2.10 15.73 12.47 0.13 0.08 21.89 16.82 75.30 62.76 
Public 1,764.75 274.32 554.56 50.08 0.54 0.24 1.96 1.90 17.74 18.47 0.13 0.09 20.24 17.94 38.52 35.25 
Cash 1,111.27 206.09 49.57 7.50 0.16 0.04 2.25 2.06 18.73 19.96 0.12 0.08 26.14 19.10 41.37 36.59 
Stock 530.64 50.30 126.14 9.81 1.34 0.25 2.51 1.95 11.96 8.22 0.18 0.09 17.50 14.18 36.29 31.49 
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Table 3$FTXLUHUV¶$QQRXQFHPHQW3HULRG5HWXUQVE\(09&s DQG7DUJHW)LUP¶V'RPLFLOH 
The table presents 5-day (t-2, t+2) DQQRXQFHPHQWSHULRG¶VFXPXODWLYHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQV&$5RIDFTXLUHUV
in percent value. The abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using the equation (1) (please see Section 3.4.1 
for more details): 
 it it mtAR R R   (1) 
Where: Rit is the return of acquirer i at time t, and Rmt is the market return measured by the changes in FTSE 
All-Share Market Index (adjusted for dividends). The returns are reported by the domicile of targets 
(domestic, CBA, and CBA sub-groups) and equity market valuations conditions (EMVCs). The financial 
conditions are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index. EMVCs is 
depicted as announcement periods of depressed (Low-EMVCs), neutral (Neutral-EMVCs), and booming 
(High-EMVCs) markets). Panel A reports acquirers¶ CAR by the state of EMVCs; HML EMVCs stands 
for High Minus Low EMVCs; Panel B reports the GLIIHUHQWLDOVEHWZHHQDFTXLUHUV¶JDLQVIURPGRPHVWLFDQG
foreign deals. The process of de-trending is discussed in Section 3.3. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The significance of the difference the means of two groups of acquirers is tested by using the t-
test of equality of means. The significance of the median is WHVWHGE\XVLQJWKHµ6LJQ¶WHVW7KHVLJQLILFDQFH
of the difference between the medians of two groups of acquirers is tested by using the Wilcoxon Two-
Sample Test. The number of deals (N) for each group is reported below the estimates of excess returns. ***, 
**, and * denote significance level at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
Panel A: Equity Market Valuations Conditions 
  ALL Low-EMVCs 
Neutral-
EMVCs 
High-
EMVCs 
HML-
EMVCs 
ALL 
Mean 1.47*** 1.15*** 1.25*** 2.09*** 0.94*** 
Median 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.63*** 0.12* 
N 6260 1565 2870 1825  
Domestic 
Mean 1.56*** 1.23*** 1.30*** 2.25*** 1.02** 
Median 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.65*** 0.15* 
N 4434 1152 2010 1272  
CBA (ALL) 
Mean 1.27*** 0.91*** 1.14*** 1.74*** 0.83* 
Median 0.47*** 0.58*** 0.39*** 0.57*** -0.01 
N 1826 413 860 553  
CBA (G6) 
Mean 0.87*** 0.71** 0.78*** 1.13** 0.42 
Median 0.36*** 0.37* 0.34* 0.39** 0.02 
N 1231 289 566 376  
CBA (RoW) 
Mean 2.08*** 1.36*** 1.83*** 3.02*** 1.66* 
Median 0.81*** 1.14** 0.51*** 1.11** -0.03 
N 595 124 294 177  
Panel B: Differentials 
Domestic vs. 
CBA (ALL) 
Mean 0.29 0.32 0.16 0.51  
Median 0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.08  
Domestic vs. 
CBA (G6) 
Mean 0.69*** 0.52 0.52* 1.12**  
Median 0.15** 0.13* 0.13 0.26*  
Domestic vs. 
CBA (RoW) 
Mean -0.52 -0.13 -0.53 -0.77  
Median -0.30** -0.64* -0.04 -0.46  
G6 vs. RoW Mean -1.21*** -0.65 -1.05** -1.89**  Median -0.45*** -0.77** -0.17* -0.72**  
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Table 4. Determinants of Announcement Period Gains to Acquirers: Cross Sectional Analysis 
Announcement period (5-days) market-adjusted abnormal returns for the full sample of acquirers are 
UHJUHVVHGDJDLQVWDVHWRIH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVWKDWDUHNQRZQWRDIIHFWDFTXLUHUV¶UHWXUQVLQFOXGLQJWKH
levels of equity market valuations conditions (EMVCs). The dependent variable (CAR) is measured by the 
5-days cumulative abnormal return of acquirers Equation (3) is estimated in a nested regression form using 
the ordinary least square method: 
 ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ෍ ߚ௝ܺ௜௝ ൅ ߝ௜௞௝ୀଵ ݅ ൌ  ? ǥ  ܰ (3) 
7KHLQWHUFHSWĮPHDVXUHVWKHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVJHQHUDWHGIRUDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUVDIWHUDFFRXQWLQJIRU
the effects of all explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variables, X, includes the following: 
acquirer age estimated as the log of the number of days between the day of bid announcement and the date 
RIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VILUVWUHFRUGLQ'DWD6WUHDPWKHUHODWLYHVL]HRIWKHGHDO estimated as the log of the ratio of 
deal value to the market capitalization of the acquirer; the DFTXLUHU¶V PDUNHW-to-book ratio (MTBV) 
estimated as the ratio of market-to-book value of equity four weeks prior to the announcement of the bid; 
liquidity measured as the ratio of total cash and equivalent to the total assets; binary (dummy) variables that 
take the value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) to represent: CBA deals, diversifying deals (target and acquirer do not 
share the same 2-digit SIC code), unlisted targets, stock-only deals, High-EMVCs, and periods of strong 
EER; and Rule of law and Political Stability which are indices measuring the quality of law, stability, and 
LQYHVWRUSURWHFWLRQREWDLQHGIURP:RUOG%DQN¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXQWU\5LVN*XLGHThe financial conditions 
are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index. The process of de-
trending is discussed in Section 3.3. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected 
IRU SRVVLEOH KHWHURVFHGDVWLFLW\ E\ XVLQJ :KLWH¶V  +HWHURVFHGDVWLFLW\ &RQVLVWHQW 6WDQGDUG (UURUV
method. VIF represents the Variance Inflation Factor (multicollinearity test: if VIF > 10 that variable is 
highly correlated to another one). ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
High-EMVCs 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.006* 0.015** 0.001 0.007 
Stock 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.007 0.020* 0.007 0.020* 
Foreign -0.001  -0.001     
G6  -0.004      
RoW  0.007*  0.012*** 0.008 0.008** 0.003 
High-EMVCs × 
Stock   0.041***     
High-EMVCs × 
RoW      0.015* 0.023* 
Effect. Ex. Rate 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
Diversifying 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Relative Size 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
Acquirer Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Acquirer MTBV -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.003** 0.002** 0.004** 
Unlisted Target 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.018*** 
Liquidity 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.004 -0.038** 0.004 -0.038** 
Political Stability     0.010  0.010 
Rule of Law     -0.022**  -0.022** 
Intercept -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 0.015 0.059** 0.016 0.060** 
F-stat 18.10*** 16.99*** 18.18*** 4.47*** 5.38*** 4.28*** 5.18*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 3.12 3.22 3.44 2.07 5.18 2.23 5.48 
Mean VIF 1.21 1.08 1.08 1.40 2.59 1.40 2.65 
N 5,625 5,625 5,625 1,699 995 1,699 995 
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Appendix A. Variables definitions 
The table describes and defines the variables used in the paper, as well as it indicates the data source. SDC is Thomson-Reuters SDC 
M&A database. With a dummy variable, a sample observation without the value of 1 has a value of 0. 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
All Deals (ALL) Refers to the entire sample analyzed in this paper. - 
Acquirer Age (AGE) Number of days between the day when the acquirer is first recorded on 'DWD6WUHDPDQGELG¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\ DataStream 
Periods of high equity 
market valuation 
conditions (High-
EMVCs) 
Dummy = 1if the M&A deal is announced during period of high equity market 
valuations conditions (EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The financial conditions 
are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market 
Index. See the text for the process of de-trending (Section 3.3). 
DataStream & SDC 
Cash Payment 
(CASH) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with 100% cash. SDC 
Cross-border 
Acquisitions (CBAs) 
Dummy = 1 with a U.K. acquirer and non-U.K. target and = 0 with both 
acquirer and target are U.K. firms (= Domestic [DOM]). SDC 
Periods of low equity 
market valuation 
conditions (Low-
EMVCs) 
Dummy = 1 if M&A deal is announced during period of low equity market 
valuations conditions (EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The financial conditions 
are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market 
Index. See the text for the process of de-trending (Section 3.3). 
DataStream & SDC 
Deal Value (DV) Bid transaction value, in millions pounds. SDC 
Diversifying (DIV) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are based in different 2-digit SIC 
industries and = 0 when both share the same 2-digit industry (= Focused 
[FOC]). 
SDC 
G6 Group of 
Countries (G6) 
G6 = 1 when a U.K. acquirer acquires a target that based in the rest of G7 
countries (=G7-U.K.) and = 0 when a U.K. acquirer acquires a target that based 
in the rest of the work (RoW=World-G7). 
SDC 
Cash Ratio 
(Liquidity) 
Measured by the ratio of total cash and equivalent to the total assets. Since 
these are annual ratios M&A deals announced before (after) June are 
matched with the ratio of the previous (same) year. 
DataStream 
Mixed Payments 
(MIXED) 
Dummy = 1 when the financing process of the deal includes a mixture of cash, 
stock, and other methods of payment. SDC 
Market-to-Book Value 
(MTBV) 
Market-to-Book Value of acquirer equity at four weeks and book value of 
equity from the most recent accounting statement prior to bid announcement. DataStream 
Market Value (MV) $FTXLUHU¶VPDUNHWYDOXHRIHTXLW\DWIRXUZHHNVSULRUWRELGDQQRXQFHPHQWLQ
million pounds. DataStream 
Periods of neutral 
equity market 
valuation conditions 
(Neutral-EMVCs) 
Dummy = 1 when the M&A deal is announced during period of neutral equity 
market valuations conditions (EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The financial 
conditions are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share 
Market Index. See the text for the process of de-trending (Section 3.3). 
DataStream & SDC 
Acquirer Premium 
(Premium) 
Takeover premium from Thomson Financial SDC computed as the difference 
EHWZHHQ WKH RIIHU SULFH DQG WKH WDUJHW¶V VWRFN SULFH IRXU ZHHNV EHIRUH WKH
acquisition announcement divided by the latter; values beyond the range of [0, 
2] are winsorized following Officer (2003). 
SDC 
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public (PUB) Dummy = 1 if target is public/listed and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
RoW Group of 
Countries (RoW) 
RoW = 1 when a U.K. acquirer acquires a target that based outside the G6 
countries (=World-G7) and = 0 when a U.K. acquirer acquires a target that 
based in the rest of G7 countries (G6=G7-U.K.). 
SDC 
Relative Size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV. DataStream & SDC 
Strong Effective 
Exchange Rate 
(SEER) 
Dummy = 1 when M&A deal is announced during period of strong Effective 
Exchange Rate (EER), or strong domestic currency, and = 0 otherwise. Bank of England 
Stock Payments 
(STOCK) Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with 100% stock exchange. SDC 
Subsidiary (SUB) Dummy = 1 if target is subsidiary firm and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is unlisted i.e. private or subsidiary, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law is an index measuring the quality and level of law and order in a 
FRXQWU\ REWDLQHG IURP :RUOG %DQN¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXQWU\ 5LVN *XLGH
(ICRG). 
World Bank - ICRG 
Political Stability 
Rule of law is an index measuring the quality and level of political stability 
DQGWHQVLRQVLQDFRXQWU\REWDLQHGIURP:RUOG%DQN¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXQWU\
Risk Guide (ICRG). 
World Bank - ICRG 
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Appendix B. Correlations among Equity Market Valuations Conditions (EMVCs) in G7 countries 
7KHWDEOHVKRZVWKHFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWVDPRQJWKH*FRXQWULHV¶HTXLW\PDUNHWLQGLFHV7KH3(UDWLR
is used to classify each of the equity market indices as low (depressed), neutral and high (booming), as in 
Bouwman et al. (2009). 
 U.S. Germany France Australia Canada Japan U.K. 
U.S. 1.00       
Germany 0.62 1.00      
France 0.68 0.79 1.00     
Australia 0.72 0.62 0.60 1.00    
Canada 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.79 1.00   
Japan 0.17 0.26 0.42 0.32 0.17 1.00  
U.K. 0.86 0.72 0.77 0.80 0.71 0.41 1.00 
 
